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Feldman: Assistance of Counsel

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Brown1
(decided April 30, 2004)
Antonio Brown was found guilty of

promoting prison

contraband in the first degree.2 On appeal, defendant contended
that in denying him representation of counsel, the trial court
violated his Sixth Amendment3 and New York State Constitutional
rights.'

The appellate court rejected Brown's claim and held that

defendant had previously

waived his right to counsel by

proceeding pro se.' In so holding, the court reasoned that "[w]hile
the Sixth Amendment and the State Constitution afford a defendant
the right to counsel or to self-representation, they do not guarantee
a right to both .

.

. [and] a defendant who elects to exercise the

right to self-representation is not guaranteed the assistance of
standby counsel during trial."6

'776 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
at 409. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.25 (McKinney 2004) which states in
pertinent part: "A person is guilty of promoting prison contraband in the first
degree when... [b]eing a person confined in a detention facility, he knowingly
and unlawfully makes, obtains or possesses any dangerous contraband."
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
4 Brown, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 409. See N.Y. CONST. art 1, § 6 which provides in
pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions ...
2 Id.

5 Brown, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
6Id. (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 741 N.E.2d 882, 884 (N.Y. 2000)).
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Initially, Brown invoked his constitutional right to be
represented by counsel.7 However, midway through the trial, he
asked the court for permission to represent himself

The trial

court informed defendant of the dangers of such an action, but
nonetheless granted his request after concluding that his decision
was "unequivocal, voluntary and intelligent."9

Subsequently,

Brown sought the assistance of a lawyer regarding the correct
approach in using prior inconsistent statements to cross-examine a
witness.

°

Brown argued that by refusing to allow counsel to assist

him in his case, the trial court violated his basic federal and New
York State Constitutional right to be represented by counsel in
presenting a defense." In affirming the denial of the request by the
trial court, the court stated that "[a] criminal defendant has no
12
Federal or State constitutional right to hybrid representation."'
Therefore, the trial court concluded that since defendant chose to
represent himself and present his own defense, he was not
guaranteed any right to the assistance of counsel. 3
The importance of the right to self-representation was
recognized in the United States Supreme Court case of Faretta v.
California.4 The FarettaCourt held that a lawyer cannot be thrust

7
1d.
8

Id.

9Id
1oBrown, 776 N.Y.S,2d at 409.

1Id
12 Id (quoting Rodriguez, 741 N.E.2d at 885).
13 Id.

14

422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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onto a defendant when he chooses to proceed pro se. 5 In Faretta,
the defendant was prosecuted and ultimately convicted for grand
theft. 6

Defendant appealed the conviction on the ground that

refusal by the trial court to allow him to present his own defense
violated his Sixth Amendment rights.'7

The Supreme Court

explained that "[t]he Sixth Amendment, when naturally read...
implies a right of self-representation."'

8

Thus, because defendant

clearly communicated his desire to represent himself and since the
record demonstrated that defendant was "literate, competent, and
understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed
free will," he had a constitutional right to present his own
defense.'

Moreover, the Court emphasized that in order for a

defendant to waive his or her right to counsel, such action must be
done -knowingly and intelligently. 20 Consequently, if the waiver
did not meet the standard, it was not valid.
Although the

Supreme

Court

created the paradigm

necessary to allow a defendant to represent himself and forego
counsel, it never explicitly addressed the issue of whether the two
rights were mutually exclusive.
5 Id. at
16

The Second Circuit recognized

807.

Id. at 807, 811.

at 810.
'"Id. at 821. The structure of the Sixth Amendment provides for the defendant
to conduct his own defense in addition to his right to counsel. Id. at 819. "It is
the accused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation,' who must be 'confronted with the witnesses against him,' and who
must be accorded compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Id
Furthermore, "[t]he right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he
who suffers the consequences if the defense fails." Id. at 819-20.
'9 Faretta,422 U.S. at 835.
20 Id. at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)).
17

Id

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2013], Art. 13

TOURO LAWREVIEW

120

[Vol 2 1

this deficiency in United States v. Purnett, where the court held
that defendant's decision to conduct his own defense did not
deprive him of his right to counsel.2 ' In Purnett,the defendant was
indicted for bank robbery.2

After defendant waived his right to

counsel, despite warnings of the dangers of such an action, the
court raised sua sponte the issue of defendant's competency to
undergo a trial. 23

Although defendant had an IQ of eighty,

deficiencies in memory and moderate paranoia, he was deemed
competent to stand trial.24 When asked if he wanted to challenge
the report, defendant responded, "I don't want to respond to
nothing. I got nothing to respond," . . . [t]hey do anything they
want to. They are accustomed to doing anything they want to.
Why do you have to make all these conflicts?

25

The trial judge

concluded from defendant's statements that he did not want a
hearing to contest the report.26

Subsequently, defendant was

convicted by a jury of robbery and other related charges and
sentenced to serve time in prison. 7
Purnett appealed his conviction on two counts. First, he
claimed that his waiver of counsel was improper because he was
not yet deemed competent to stand trial.2 8 Alternatively, defendant
contended that since he was not represented by counsel at the time
21

910 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1990).

22

Id. at 52.

23

Id. at 53.

24 Id.
25 id.
26
27

28

Purnett,910 F.2d at 53.

at52.
Id. at 54.
1d.
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of his competency evaluation, the report was invalid. 29 The court
stated, "the right to self-representation and the assistance of
counsel are separate rights depicted on the opposite side of the
same Sixth Amendment coin. To choose one obviously means to
forego the other."3

However, here the court concluded, Purnett

did not properly "choose" self-representation. 3' The court found
that where competency is at issue, a "knowing and intelligent
waiver of the right to counsel" cannot be determined and thus
counsel must be appointed until the question of competency is
resolved.32
In New York, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's
pro se motions because they were not accepted by defense
counsel.33 In People v. Rodriguez. defendant allegedly robbed a
woman while she was leaving the elevator of her apartment
building.35

Before trial, defendant offered two pro se motions

requesting dismissal of the charges because he had been denied his
right to a speedy trial. 3

6

Between the submission of the first and

second motion, defendant sought to relieve his lawyer of his duties
because of improper representation. 3

7

Upon questioning by the

court, defense counsel recommended his own removal because of

29

Id

30 Id.
31 Purnett,901
32

Id. at 56.

33 Rodriguez,
14

Id.at 882.

F.2d at 55.

741 N.E.2d at 883.

35id.
36
37

Id. at 884.
id
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communication problems between the two.3' The trial court agreed
to the representation by new counsel; the defendant was
nonetheless convicted of robbery in the first degree.39
Rodriguez argued that under the federal and New York
State constitutions, he had a right to self-representation, and thus,
the trial court erred in dismissing his pro se motions.4" The Court
of Appeals rejected defendant's claims and held that "because a
defendant has no constitutional right to hybrid representation, the
decision to allow such representation lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court."4 ' Furthermore, the court concluded
that the trial judge acted within his discretion, since defendant was
represented by counsel who refused to adopt his "frivolous" pro se
motions at the time he filed them.42
Similarly, in People v. Richardson, the New York Court of
Appeals found that defendant did not have an absolute right to
personally address the jury.43

At trial, defendant who was

represented by counsel, did not take the stand and was ultimately
convicted of first degree murder."

At summation, the trial court

denied defendant's request to address the jury.4 5 The defendant
appealed, contending that according to the constitution, he had a

Rodriguez, 741 N.E.2d at 884.
Id. Although the court did not find that the trial judge abused his discretion,
defendant's conviction was overturned on other grounds. Id. at 885.
40Id at 885.
38

39

41 id.
42

id.

149 N.E.2d 875, 875-76 (N.Y. 1958).
' Id.at 875.
41

45 id.
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fundamental right to address the jury.4 6 The Court of Appeals
affirmed by holding that a criminal defendant has no right to
supersede counsel and perform his own summation. 7 The court
concluded that a defendant's participation in the trial process,
when he or she is represented by counsel, is left to the discretion of
the trial judge.48
Moreover, the court tackled the difficult issue of whether
the use of the ambiguous conjunctive "and" in the wording of the
New York Constitution meant that when a defendant invokes his or
her right to counsel, the defendant consequently waives his or her
right to self-representation (or vice-versa). 9

In uncovering the

answer, the court considered the purpose of the placement of the
words "as in civil actions."5

Specifically, the court opined, "the

defendant's [Sixth Amendment] right in a criminal action to appear
and defend in person and with counsel is the same 'as in civil
actions.'

"5

Under Section 236 of the Civil Practice Act, a person

may be represented by himself or herself or by counsel. In other
words, "and"

was preceded by the more restrictive

"or."

Furthermore, the Act continued, if the person "has an attorney...
he cannot appear to act in person except with the consent of the
court.

52

By"conforming the practice in criminal cases to that 'in

civil actions,"' the drafters of the New York Constitution did not
Id. at 875-76.
Id at 876.
48 Richardson, 149 N.E.2d at 876.
49
1d.
50 Id
46

47

5' Id. (emphasis added).
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intend that the right to self-representation and the right to counsel
to be absolute. 3
Both the New York State courts and the federal courts hold
that a criminal defendant has no right to hybrid representation.

4

Rather, if the accused has invoked either his right to selfrepresentation or right to counsel, it is at the discretion of the trial
court judge to determine whether the accused can subsequently
invoke his right to counsel or right to self-representation. 5
Furthermore, both New York State and federal courts concur that a
criminal defendant may proceed pro se, if the court determines that
he or she is "literate, competent and understanding" and that the
waiver of counsel was voluntary.56
Although the federal courts have held that a criminal
defendant is not guaranteed self-representation if he is represented
by counsel (or vice versa), they do not cover the unique
circumstances addressed in the New York case People v. Brown.
Specifically, Brown considered whether a defendant who chose to
be represented by counsel only to waive that right, may then re-

12

Id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 321(a) (McKinney 2004).

" Richardson. 149 N.E.2d at 876.
54See,

e.g., Purnett, 910 F.2d at 54 (explaining that to choose either the right

to self-representation or the right to counsel "obviously means to forego the
other."); Rodriguez, 741 N.E.2d at 883 (stating that "a criminal defendant is not
entitled to hybrid representation.").
55Rodriguez, 741 N.E.2d at 883.
56 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. See Purnett, 910 F.2d at 54-55 (stating that "a

defendant's waiver of counsel is valid only where it can be shown from the
record that the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently"); Brown, 776
N.Y.S.2d at 409 (noting that the record establishes that defendant's waiver of
the right to counsel was unequivocal, voluntary and intelligent").
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/13
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exercise his right to counsel.5 7 Such a complicated sequence of
events has not been addressed by the federal courts. New York has
concluded that such a decision still remains up to the discretion of
the trial judge.5
In conclusion, the right to counsel and right to selfrepresentation are both equally important rights valued by the
drafters of the Constitution. According to federal and state law, to
choose one does not necessarily guarantee the defendant a
constitutional right to the other. To allow for such absolute rights
would be "disruptive of orderly court procedure and the proper
administration of justice."59

Therefore, it is imperative that a

criminal defendant refrain from casually choosing to represent
himself. There may be great harm in such a decision, for once an
accused invokes his pro se rights, his right to counsel is
eviscerated. Such a fundamental right can then only be reinvoked,
not at the defendant's will, but rather at the discretion of the trial
judge. Such a decision is not likely to be overturned unless the
lofty burden of abuse of discretion is met.

Jennifer Feldman

57 Brown, 776
58 id.
59

N.Y.S.2d at 409.

Richardson, 149 N.E.2d at 877.
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